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Abstract
This article contributes to a better understanding of the process of entrepreneurial finance from a
behavioral perspective. We specifically examine the cognitive features and interaction of three key-actors in
entrepreneurial finance: entrepreneurs, business angels and venture capitalists and derive implications for
performance (value creation and growth) when a young venture raises external equity capital. Concepts of
cognitive cost and value enhance theoretical insight into why BA and VC intervention is typically sequential. We
also predict in what specific situations one should expect simultaneous coinvestment by BAs and VCs and how
investors can use cognitive levers to influence the speed of growth.
Keywords: Business Angel, Venture Capitalist, Cognitive Governance, Venture Growth.
Introduction
Young entrepreneurial firms are an essential vector of economic growth and dynamism. Such
ventures face especially strong challenges in managing the dynamics of growth (Hambrick
and Crozier, 1985) and attempting to tackle specific strategic hurdles (Graebner and
Eisenhardt, 2004). Part of the challenge is to gain access to and assemble various critical
resources in an effort to fuel growth and get the venture on an expansion path. Frequently,
resource needs come in the form of financial capital. When internal funding and the founder’s
personal wealth are insufficient to cover the financing needed for further growth, external
investors, such as business angels or professional venture capitalists, may contribute critical
resources in the form of equity finance. This brings about significant change in the ownership
structure.
Bringing in new shareholders then raises the question of the nature and quality of the
relationship between the different shareholder categories and the entrepreneur, in as much as
the investors may exert significant influence over venture performance (Lindsay, 2004;
Mason & Harrison, 2002; Wiltbank, 2005; Wiltbank et al., 2009). The relationships between
the entrepreneur and the new external investors are typically mediated by various governance
mechanisms such as investor participation on corporate boards (Rosenstein et al. 1993;
Sapienza et al., 1996), terms of contract (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004) and incentives linked
to ownership structure (Bitler et al., 2006).
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The academic literature on the governance of entrepreneur-investor relations has mainly
approached the issue from the perspective of agency theory (Daily et al., 2003), according to
which the corporate governance system essentially assumes a disciplinary role, improving
performance through economizing on agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; van
Osnabrugge, 2000; Bitler et al. 2006). More recently, empirically grounded studies have come
to question such an exclusive focus on the disciplinary role of corporate governance,
especially in the field of young entrepreneurial ventures. Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004), for
instance, observed venture capitalists and business angels play a supportive strategic role in
corporate governance, the latter working as a “syndicate” of cooperating peers rather than as a
“monitor” of principal-agent relationships.
An alternative approach to corporate governance, borrowing from knowledge-based and
behavioral theories, has begun to emerge and to present a major challenge to the dominant
disciplinary approach. This alternative view may be qualified as cognitive, for it recognizes
the potential role of governance in the process of strategy formulation and in the acquisition
of managerial capabilities. Prominent examples of studies devoted to cognitive aspects of
governance are Forbes and Milliken (1999), Rindova (1999), Charreaux (2002), Kor and
Sundaramurthy (2008). According to these studies, the role played by the various actors
involved in corporate governance and their impact on strategic outcomes and performance
may be dependent on their specific cognitive background (experience, education, mindsets,
decision-making heuristics ...) and interaction (learning, cognitive process ...).
Filatotchev and Wright (2005) promote the idea of the existence of a corporate governance
life cycle, thereby suggesting that the specific role played by corporate governance in
mediating entrepreneur-investor relationships may actually depend on a firm’s stage of
development. The present article is focused on the governance of young entrepreneurial
ventures which raise external equity to finance further growth. Entrepreneurial firms may be
assumed to face especially strong cognitive challenges, for at least three reasons: (1)
entrepreneurs have been shown to present specific cognitive features affecting their decision-
making process (Busenitz and Barney, 1997 ; Forbes, 1999; Krueger, 2003; Sarasvathy,
2001), (2) entrepreneurs’ specific education and experience may lead to the discovery of
business opportunies not evident to people with different mindsets (Shane, 2000), (3)
entrepreneurs may lack the requisite managerial capabilities to exploit the perceived
opportunities and sustain high levels of growth (Hambrick and Crozier, 1985; Hellmann and
Puri, 2002; Wasserman, 2001). For all those reasons, the arrival of and interaction with
specific investor types may have strong implications for the perception of the venture’s best
strategic opportunities and of the best way to capture and exploit them. Differences in
cognition between entrepreneurs and investors may induce costs or increase value, depending
on the precise nature of such differences and the unfolding dynamics of interaction. Hence
costs may arise when mutually inconsistent mindsets lead to strong conflict over the best
strategic options that should be adopted, whereas value may emanate from the heterogenous
experience and capabilities which certain investors bring to the venture, stimulating processes
of organizational learning.
The present study develops a conceptual framework of the governance of young
entrepreneurial ventures that open their capital to external investors in pursuit of a strong
growth strategy. We do not challenge the fact that considerations of personal interest, as
agency theory would have it, are present in entrepreneur-investor interactions and that
investors seek to protect themselves from the consequences of potential managerial
opportunism. Rather, we think that concepts of cognitive cost and value, represent a useful
complement to deepen our understanding of venture governance and its impact on
performance and value creation. Our proposal is that issues of discipline and cognition are
both relevant to the governance of investor-entrepreneur relations., Cognitive issues do
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however appear to be particularly important at an early stage in the growth process of young
ventures. One central contribution of our framework is to go beyond the concentration of the
ownership structure to consider the specific impact of different owner categories on
performance. Business angels and venture capitalists have been shown to be significant
suppliers of growth capital to growing entrepreneurial firms. They differ in many respects.
Business angels are frequently experienced entrepreneurs who invest their own money,
preferably in industries that they already know. They are not only driven by financial
objectives (Morrissette, 2007). Venture capitalists are more typically professionals who
manage funds with the objective of maximising the financial return for their fund providers.
Although some of them may be former entrepreneurs, they have diversified backgrounds and
they generally invest in a larger span of industries than business angels. These differences
might impact investors’ behaviour and the interaction they establish with entrepreneurs, from
both the disciplinary and the cognitive perspective. Our framework has empirical implications
concerning the various roles of angel investors and VCs in the governance processes of young
entrepreneurial ventures and for their impact on the creation of value.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 1 gives a brief review of the
dominant approach of governance related to entrepreneurial finance, questions its relevance,
and then goes on to put special emphasis on the cognitive features of entrepreneurial finance.
Section 2 presents a review of the literature on angel financing and venture capital and
characterizes typical features of these two investor categories, which can be expected to have
a bearing on agency costs and on cognitive costs and value. Section 3 proposes empirical
implications derived from the combined framework.
1. Investor Relations in Entrepreneurial Finance: Beyond Agency Theory1
Jensen and Meckling (1976) made the seminal contribution to positive agency theory which
has become the dominant theoretical framework for analyzing shareholder-manager
relationships. The starting point in Jensen and Meckling’s analysis is an entrepreneurial firm,
where the founder is the only shareholder and the manager at the same time. In this situation,
agency conflicts are absent, because the entrepreneur completely internalizes the value impact
of his decisions. Things change when the entrepreneur sells outside equity because such a
scenario creates an incentive for the founder/manager to pursue his personal interests to the
detriment of the new shareholders. Consequently, when a new shareholder enters, agency
costs arise. Such an increase can however be reduced by putting in place the appropriate
monitoring and incentive mechanisms. Hence, from the agency perspective, corporate
governance follows an exclusively disciplinary orientation, functioning as a check on
conflicting interests.
The question arises, however, why the entrepreneur should open up his venture to investors in
the first place since this brings about agency costs which will be anticipated and priced by the
potential external shareholders anyway. Jensen and Meckling’s answer is in the recognition of
the entrepreneur’s personal budget constraint. That is to say that the sale of outside equity
may be the only means to capture certain value enhancing investment opportunities, simply
by loosening the firm’s budget constraint. Thus, outside equity brings the firm on a value
enhancing “expansion path”, as long as the incremental value generated from expansion
exceeds the marginal agency costs induced by the decrease of the entrepreneur’s ownership
stake. The value created by an external shareholder, say a private equity firm, stems from the
funds it contributes and its capacity of controlling managerial agency costs by devising the
appropriate incentive and control mechanisms. In discussing the O.M. Scott LBO for instance,
1 This section strongly builds on earlier work by one of the authors (Wirtz, 2010).
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Baker and Wruck (1989) make a case for the private equity firm’s ability to design
governance mechanisms (remuneration design, management participation, board of director
functioning, covenants) which help decrease agency costs. It should however be noted that, in
the initial agency model, the outside shareholders play no role in constructing the investment
opportunity set itself. The latter is given, and the role of outside shareholders is restricted to
bringing in financial capital and to supporting the residual risk, while controlling the objective
attributes of their investments by maintaining transparency on information flows. In such a
model, outside shareholders’ governance activity is restricted to monitoring and contract
enforcement. Agency theory thus focuses on controlling costs of conflicting interests when
information is asymmetrically distributed. Investors enhance value through governance by
crafting the appropriate monitoring and incentive mechanisms. Monitoring reduces
information asymmetry, whereas incentives align the entrepreneur’s interests with those of
external shareholders. Jensen (1993) considers the governance mechanisms developed by
certain private equity firms as especially efficacious when it comes to economizing on agency
costs.
Though this may be one important explanation for the success of certain ventures, in many
cases, the success and performance of entrepreneurial growth firms is not due to financial
incentives and monitoring alone. In fact, one major shortcoming of agency theory lies in its
implicit assumptions about the origin and the recognition of opportunities to create value. The
origin of strategic opportunities and the recognition of their value creation potential are
actually exogenous to the theory, and it is simply assumed that good (positive NPV) and bad
(negative NPV) projects somehow exist. They are given by the environment, and to maximize
value, it is important to have access to information about the good projects, to give incentives
to the entrepreneur to choose the good ones and to make him expend optimal effort.
The strategic management literature however has a longstanding tradition in recognizing that
making a competitive strategy is as much about cognition (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Huff,
1990; Walsh, 1995), vision (Fransman, 1994; Witt, 1998), and difficult to imitate capabilities
(Penrose, 1959; Teece, Pisano, Shuen, 1997), as it is about mere information. What an
entrepreneur perceives as the best strategy depends on his or her specific mindset. The same
goes for an investor. Mindsets are influenced by individual and collective learning processes,
which may be highly specific and path dependent. Part of such learning is tacit in nature and
thus difficult to communicate to others. One implication of the cognitive nature of strategy
formulation is the fact that many value creation opportunities do not exist independently of
the people who conceive them in specific organizational settings. The art of strategy is not
simply about choosing the objectively best strategy in a predefined menu. Strategy is created
in processes of individual and organizational learning (Nonaka and al., 2001), which rely on
capabilities that go beyond the control of conflicting interests.
Fransman (1994) illustrates the central importance of knowledge in creating and realizing the
potential of corporate success. He actually draws a clear distinction between information, as it
is present in agency theory, and knowledge, as employed in strategic management and
evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Information is in fact defined as objective
data about states of the world and state-contingent outcomes. As such, it is a closed set. It may
be asymmetrically distributed, but its transfer from one stakeholder to another is possible,
albeit at a cost (monitoring costs). In such a context, an information’s meaning is
unambiguous. Things change when the precise meaning of any given information depends on
peoples’ mindsets. Thus, even if knowledge evolves with the acquisition of information, there
is “loose coupling” between the two concepts, which is to say that the interpretation of any
piece of information in terms of value creation is not self evident but depends on people’s
mental patterns at the time they receive the information. The latter may then have an impact
on mental patterns and belief structures, but these change in a highly path-dependent way, so
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that the knowledge gained from new information is sometimes very different from one person
to another, depending on education and personal experience. In fact, Fransman defines
knowledge as dynamic mental constructs. So, in comparison to agency theory’s conception of
information, knowledge is an open set. It is created in an ongoing learning process, part of
which is tacit (Nonaka and al., 2001).
Beyond their privileged access to information in the above defined sense, top managers’
specific knowledge structures can hence be crucial in an effort to create value and stimulate
growth. In their work on upper echelons, Hambrick and Mason (1984) actually consider a
firm’s strategy and performance to be a reflection of its top managers’ cognitive base and
values. Since there is only loose coupling between objective information and knowledge
gained, some people perceive opportunities for value creation and others do not, even if
information is distributed symmetrically. In such a situation, monitoring and incentive
alignment alone are insufficient to increase a firm’s value and engage in the dynamics of
growth. This is because information from the environment is perceived through the lens of an
entrepreneur’s specific mindset. The latter influences strategy formulation and, ultimately, a
firm’s performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).
One important implication is that there may be a conflict between an entrepreneur and his
firm’s investors about the best strategy to follow, independently of any problem of conflicting
interests, and that cognition may hence influence the dynamics of governance. As Conner and
Prahalad (1996) put it: “[...] truthful individuals honestly may disagree about the best present
and future course of action for their business activities. Or, the parties may possess different
mindsets generally. Discord fundamentally derives from personal knowledge that cannot be
communicated fully to others at the time of the disagreement.” (p. 483). Consequently, our
understanding of entrepreneur-investor relations may gain from admitting the existence of
cognitive (or knowledge) asymmetry, which is different in nature from mere information
asymmetry.
Such cognitive asymmetry is likely to induce conflicts due to mutual misunderstanding
among stakeholders (e.g. the entrepreneur and certain external shareholders). Such conflicts
are not rooted in mutually inconsistent interests and thus cannot be tackled by the means of
interest alignment alone, as traditional agency theory would have it. Their resolution depends
on stakeholders’ initial skills and knowledge, as well as on their willingness and capability to
learn. Thus cognitive conflicts cause costs which may be labelled as cognitive costs.
The costs stemming from cognitive conflicts are different in nature from costs rooted in
agency conflicts. They are related to the various efforts undertaken by stakeholders to
overcome differences in the perception of opportunities, to convince others of the relevancy
of their conceptions (e.g. an innovative business model), as well as to eventual losses of
efficiency due to lasting differences in understanding. Table 1 sketches out different types of
potential cognitive costs in comparison with the traditional agency costs.
[Table 1 here]
The above presentation of cognitive costs emanating from the relationship between
entrepreneurs and external stakeholders, such as business angels and venture capitalists,
shows that these costs are linked to learning processes that potentially lead to a transformation
of strategic knowledge (which may reduce the gap between different mindsets) and to an
acquisition of new managerial capabilities. It is however important to emphasize that
cognitive conflict differs from traditional agency conflict in a fundamental way. In fact,
agency conflict is always value reducing, and as long as the marginal cost of monitoring and
bonding remains inferior to the marginal reduction in residual losses, the latter’s minimization
will maximize value. Not so with cognitive heterogeneity, which can actually be value
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enhancing (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Hambrick et al., 1996), in as much as it opens up new
strategic perspectives and allows to sustain an ongoing process of learning and innovation.
Consequently, the specific mindsets of external stakeholders, say business angels or venture
capitalists, different from the entrepreneur’s own, not only generate cognitive cost, but may
also contribute cognitive value by bringing in new perspectives and valuable experience.
Depending on their specific cognition and the latter’s relative match with the entrepreneur’s
mindset, investors may act in such a way as to enhance the dynamics of mutual learning and
thus support strong growth. In this case, governance would actually increase entrepreneurial
discretion, furthering the capabilities required to manage the dynamics of strong growth.
Young technology ventures evolve in a highly uncertain environment, where knowledge
about the best strategic opportunities is especially ambiguous. This makes cognition
potentially a highly relevant variable in entrepreneur-investor relations. So, one may wonder
if the disciplinary approach, rooted in agency theory and preoccupied with closely monitoring
managerial discretion, is sufficient when it comes to explaining the dynamic interaction
between entrepreneurs and investors in entrepreneurial ventures at an early stage in the
process of growth. We may expect to gain explanatory power from combining basic
principles of agency theory with the cognitive approach. According to the latter, investors use
corporate governance to gain better understanding of entrepreneurial opportunity and as a
lever to enhance strategic vision and managerial capability with a potentially strong impact on
performance.
2. Business Angels, Venture Capitalists and Governance
From the above, it follows that, in as much as specific investors have specific cognitive
features, investor type can be expected to have a significant impact on venture performance
and success. This may help understand specific configurations of investors at specific stages
of venture growth. Two broad investor categories are especially important for entrepreneurial
finance and have been shown to assume complementary roles (Harrison, Mason, 2000) when
it comes to supporting venture growth: business angels and venture capitalists. What are their
specific roles and contributions to the governance and performance of young ventures?
Empirical research has shown them to differ by their origin, previous experience and
objectives. They tend to establish different types of contractual and informal relationships
with venture founders. They assume complementary roles over the life cycle of young
ventures, as BAs generally invest small amounts of money at early stages whereas venture
capital funds invest larger amounts at the expansion stage. In certain cases, however, they do
invest simultaneously in the same venture.
In this section we first document major empirical differences between BA and VC
characteristcs, as well as the specific investment and governance processes they typically
engage in. In a second step, we derive theoretical implications for the governance of young
growth ventures by VCs and BAs from the two basic theoretical frameworks: agency theory
and the cognitive approach.
2.1. Empirical differences between BAs and VCs
The typical BA and VC each have specific characteristics
In the literature on entrepreneurial finance, BAs are described as “resembling more” to
entrepreneurs than to VCs (Farrel, 1998), as being “closer” to entrepreneurs than VCs are
(Kelly & Hay, 2003), as having an entrepreneurial orientation (Lindsay, 2004). BAs are
predominantly actual or former entrepreneurs who invest their own money (Morrissette,
2007), whereas VCs are finance professionals who manage investors’ money. Therefore BAs’
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knowledge base and cognitive process are close to entrepreneurs’. Due to their experience
they generally have good knowledge of a specific technology, industrial sector or market, and
they express a preference for investing in industries they know (Wright & al., 1999; van
Osnabrugge, 1999). VCs, although some of them may have technological or industrial
experience or expertise, often have a more generalist background (MBA, consulting or
financial experience).
With regard to cognitive process typical in entrepreneurial decision making, two important
specificities emerge from the literature: intuition and effectuation. Entrepreneurial intuition is
defined by Mitchell & Friga (2005) as “the dynamic process by which entrepreneurial
alertness cognitions interact with domain competence (e.g., culture, industry, specific
circumstances, technology, etc.) to bring to consciousness an opportunity to create new
value.” According to van Osnabrugge & Robinson (2000, in Morissette) BAs primarily assess
the entrepreneur (vs. the business model) in their selection process and largely base their
decisions on their own judgment and gut feeling rather than on extensive due diligence. The
proper assessment of the entrepreneur’s intuition hence plays a significant role. To the
contrary, VCs use a more formal, extensive and analytical approach based on the analysis of
entrepreneurs’ references and past experience, of venture technology, of potential market and
competition, and of financial projections (Wiltbank, 2005). This may be due to differences in
cognitive ability and style between BAs and VCs, but also to the fact that VCs manage other
people’s money and need therefore to document and justify their decisions in order to show to
their fund providers that they behave in a responsible and rational manner (van Osnabrugge,
2000).
Effectuation, or effectual logic, is a construct that aims at describing how entrepreneurs take
strategic decisions in uncertain environments (Sarasvathy, 2001). Rather than using a
predictive approach (i.e. trying to forecast future outcomes using detailed market studies,
financial projections, etc.) in order to pre-determine precise opportunities, goals and expected
returns, as VCs usually do, many entrepreneurs use an “effectual”, non predictive, approach.
This means that they do not try to first predict future outcomes and then match them with
resources needed to attain predicted outcomes. Effectuators rather try to control (shape)
outcomes (possible effects) based on their initial endowments with resources, strengths, social
networks, and progressively manage to transform their environment as they go along thus
creating new opportunities. According to Wiltbank & al. (2009), BAs use both predictive and
non predictive (effectual) approaches in their investment decisions, albeit in different
proportion. They suggest a moderate tendency toward one dominant approach over the other,
some BAs being more predictive (much like formal venture capitalists), others more effectual
(like the entrepreneurs of the ventures they invest in). Interestingly, BAs who emphasize a
non predictive (effectual) approach experience a reduction in investment failures without a
reduction in success rates.
BAs’ investment objectives also appear to be closer to entrepreneurs’ than those of VCs. BAs
want to make money but they grant less importance than VCs to precise IRR and exit timing
objectives, and they appear to have diverse non financial goals such as challenge, fun, helping
to start a new company, that are as (or more) important for them as (than) financial goals
(Farrel, 1998; Kelly & Hay, 2003; Morrissette, 2007). VCs set their objectives in financial
terms only and need to control the exit as they are committed to create value for their fund
providers in a limited time frame.
The respective characteristics of first-time entrepreneurs, BAs and VCs as they emerge from
the entrepreneurship literature are summarized in table 2.
[table 2 here]
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BAs and VCs use different investment processes
The dynamics of venture capital investing can be represented as a five step process: deal
sourcing, deal screening, deal evaluation, deal structuring, and post-investment activities
(monitoring, exit) (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). In as far as it has an impact on managerial
discretion, the investment process at large may be analyzed as an exercise in corporate
governance. We present in table 3 a comparison of the respective procedures used by BAs ad
VCs based on the literature on angel and venture capital investing.
The main distinctive features of BAs’ investment process, compared to VCs, may be
summarized as follows:
• BAs are typically more intuitive, less formal and analytical in deal selection and
evaluation.
• They bring specific entrepreneurship experience and sector knowledge, and look for
close interactions with management in order to contribute assistance, advice and
personal contacts to the venture. VCs bring more extensive financial and general
management experience.
• BAs negotiate less extensive contracts, relying more on their capacity to intervene as
events unfold (effectuation), whereas formal VCs try to anticipate major risks as much
as possible and consequently put more weight on clauses aiming at reducing agency
risk.
[table 3 here]
2.2. Theoretical implications for the respective roles of BAs and VCs in venture governance
and performance
Informal and Formal Venture Finance in the Light of Agency Theory
According to agency theory, agency risks exist in young venture financing because of strong
information asymmetry (on the quality of the project and of the entrepreneur) and of the
existence of potential conflicts of interest between financial investors and entrepreneurs. They
may be significant because most young ventures rely mainly on intangible assets and on the
goodwill, ethics and abilities of the entrepreneurial team (van Osnabrugge, 2000). These risks
theoretically exist for BAs and VCs likewise. It is consequently assumed that investors mainly
use governance mechanisms to reduce agency risks, through active monitoring and
contractual clauses designed to enhance their control over the venture, to limit their downside
risk, and to incentivize entrepreneurs to create value.
[table 4 here]
Agency theory has frequently been applied to the explanation of venture capital governance.
Kaplan & Strömberg (2004) identify four types of agency risks that VCs may encounter in
their investment process. Based on their findings and on similar studies, we match in table 4
specific governance mechanisms typically used by VCs with specific agency risks. Previous
research indicates that VCs tend indeed to reinforce these governance mechanisms when they
perceive increased agency risks (KS, 2004; Barney & al., 1994).
Agency theory has also been used to study BAs’ investment process, with results that feature
some notable differences with VCs. BAs are not unaware of potential agency risks, but they
typically manage them by different means. They seem to rely more on their own capacity to
act, than on up-front contracts. Vis-à-vis the adverse selection problem, they rely significantly
on their own judgment and on trusted referral sources more than on extensive due diligence
(van Osnabrugge, 2000). They also seem to consider that they can manage agency risks
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through their level of involvement in the post-investment phase, by establishing a trusting and
positive relationship with entrepreneurs (Landström, 1992). They work within a framework of
“incomplete contracts” and, consequently, bother less about due diligence and contractual
detail than VCs, as they think they will be able to reach positive outcomes through their post-
deal involvement (van Osnabrugge, 2000).
In a survey of 106 UK based BAs, Kelly & Hay (2003) have however identified five “non
negotiable” clauses (i.e. that are almost always included by BAs in the contracts with
entrepreneurs) : (i) veto rights over acquisitions/divestitures; (ii) prior approval for strategic
plans and budgets; (iii) restrictions on management’s ability to issue share options; (iv) non
compete contracts required from entrepreneurs upon termination of employment in the
venture; and (v) restrictions on the ability to raise additional debt or equity finance.
Interestingly, clauses frequently used by VCs are absent from this list, such as performance
dependant compensation, liquidation claims and anti-dilution clauses, forced exit, vesting
entrepreneurs shares. BAs seem to be more preoccupied with controlling strategic decisions
post-investment than with the provision of financial incentives to entrepreneurs. However one
should note that BAs with a longer investment experience tend to negotiate tighter financial
clauses, thus adopting a behaviour closer to VCs in monitoring entrepreneurs.
The above developments indicate that BAs and VCs may be concerned with agency risks
likewise, albeit to different degrees. So agency theory would predict that BAs as well as
formal VCs conduct the investment process by using various governance mechanisms
primarily as a means to control for objective agency risks, at each stage of the process.
Although the precise nature of the governance mechanisms employed may differ from one
investor to another (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004), their economic role is supposed to be
identical: maximize shareholder value through strong financial discipline. Governance is
supposed to grant investors access to objective information (not subjective knowledge in the
above defined sense) and achieve interest alignement. Be it through formal due diligence or
elaborate contractual arrangements (in the case of VCs) or through personal contact and
hands-on monitoring (in the case of BAs), agency theory is focussed on interest alignment,
not cognition. From this perspective, what is the respective role of BAs and VCs in the case of
a co-investment in the same venture? On the one hand, the multiplication of different
investors may intensify potential agency conflicts, because of the diversification of interests at
stake. On the other hand, specific investor-types may have access to specific information, due
to the specific governance mechanisms they have developed (cf. Jensen, 1993, referring to the
governance mechanisms developed by private equity firms). So BAs and VCs might be
considered to be complementary in terms of the specific information each is able to access
(and certify), which should lead to a decrease in information asymmetry.
Business Angels and Venture Capitalists in a Cognitive Framework
The above quoted litterature on BAs and VCs indicates that these two investor categories
typically have different cognitive features, be it in terms of knowledge gained from formal
education and professional experience, or in terms of cognitive style and process (intuition
and effectuation vs. prediction). This may induce a gap between investors’ mindsets and those
of entrepreneurs of varying magnitude at the time these different actors first come into
contact. Bringing in different investor categories hence theoretically creates cognitive
heterogeneity which is a potential source of cognitive conflict and cost. If the cognitive
mismatch between a particular investor and the entrepreneur is too strong, the relationship
may be interrupted rapidly, without any financing taking place, not because of an absence of
objective information, but because of mutual misunderstanding. The cognitive distance
between BAs having strong entrepreneurial experience and entrepreneurs should be smaller
than between VCs and entrepreneurs. Reduced cognitive distance may allow for an intuitive
understanding of the intrinsic value of an entrepreneur’s original project, without formal
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financial projections. Conversely, the typical VC’s mental distance from first-time
entrepreneurs may be stronger than in the case of BAs, for reasons of differences in training
and in the resulting specific modes of reasoning.
BAs with an entrepreneurial background present many similarities with entrepreneurs in terms
of cognitive process and knowledge base. In fact, they often invest in industries they already
know, which should facilitate their understanding of the new venture’s strengths and
weaknesses. However, the similarity between BAs and entrepreneurs is not complete.
Although having a lot in common, they still may have different mindsets and knowledge
bases, partially due to differences in their specific prior experience. We therefore expect
externalizing costs from entrepreneurs towards BAs to be moderate.
BAs who seek strong involvement and close interaction with entrepreneurs can thus share
their entrepreneurial experience, provide mentoring and fill the competence gap existing in
the top management team of the new venture at a relatively low cognitive cost. We can expect
this involvement to be a source of knowledge transfer to the entrepreneurial team. It can
therefore be assumed that BA/entrepreneur interaction has the potential to produce a high
cognitive value through learning, particularly in the case of first time entrepreneurs, who may
benefit more from the transfer of previous entrepreneurial experience by BAs. It should be
noted however that maintaining a close interaction with entrepreneurs may be excessively
time consuming and costly if the venture is located far away, which may explain why most
BAs invest locally (Kelly & Hay, 2003).
The likelihood of a cognitive gap between VCs and entrepreneurs is greater than between
BAs and entrepreneurs at an early stage of venture growth, if we consider the fact that they
generally work from a different knowledge base, have different prior experience, and specific
cognitive processes. Cognitive conflict may be strong during the pre-investment phase,
particularly if the VC adopts a rigid attitude in due-diligence and in contract negotiation. For
example, inexperienced entrepreneurs may be upset by (what they considers as) an excessive
tendency towards the use of formal analysis, predictive approach (detailed action plans and
financial forecasts), downside contractual protections for investors and forced exit clauses,
simply because they do not share the same cognitive logic than VCs. Entrepreneurs may need
to engage in costly externalizing activities in order to convince VCs of the value creation
potential of the venture, as the latter lack specific industrial and technical knowledge and want
to conduct formal and extensive due diligence. We therefore anticipate that there may be
relatively high cognitive costs resulting from VC-entrepreneur interactions. However this may
be moderated by several factors:
- Cognitive conflict may diminish over time, even during the pre-investment phase, as it
can be expected that mutual understanding and shared knowledge will develop in the process
of interaction;
- Experienced VCs may be less rigid and more prone to understanding entrepreneurs’
logic than young VCs, who need to establish a track record and who have a shorter experience
of dealing with entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs may also be more able to understand VCs’ logic
when they had previous opportunities to deal with them;
- In the case of a co-investment by BAs and VCs, BAs may help reduce the cognitive
gap between VCs and entrepreneurs as they appear to be “in the middle”, sharing cognitive
characteristics with both, and being close to entrepreneurs (as peers) as well as to VCs (as co-
investors). According to previous research, VCs view BAs’ active involvement in the post-
investment phase, and their ability to fill possible competence gaps in the entrepreneurial
team, as major advantages of co-investing (Harrison and Mason, 2000).
It should be emphasized that particular entrepreneurs’ and investors’ respective mental
features are not static, but can be expected to evolve in a complex process of interaction.
Hence, the different actors’ specific experience counts very much. It is thus possible that a VC
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compensates a lack of personal experience as an entrepreneur through his frequent contacts
with the entrepreneurs he funds. VCs, BAs and entrepreneurs featuring a certain degree of
cognitive heterogeneity at the outset learn in the process of interaction. When VCs and BAs
coinvest in the same venture, they may be supposed to make complementary contributions,
due to their heterogenous cognitive resources. It may thus be supposed that, early in the
investment process, before any formal contracts are put in place, BAs play an especially
strong cognitive role, in as much as they gain intuitive understanding of the entrepreneur’s
project, being able to translate the entrepreneurial idea into financial language. In fact, BAs
can gain an intimate understanding of both worlds – the entrepreneurial and the financial –
through their personal experience. They can thus play a helpful role early in the fundraising
process, helping the entrepreneur to explain his venture’s intrisic value at a low cognitive cost
to professional investors, potentially willing to contribute funds. The VCs’ cognitive role and
enhancement of performance, different in nature from the BAs’, can be supposed to increase
at later stages of venture growth. In fact, VCs have been reported to contribute managerial
capabilities in a mentoring effort leading to a professionalization of functional capabilities
(Hellman and Puri, 2002). Such professionnalization is instrumental in tackling the challenges
that arise when crossing certain organizational thresholds.
Table 5 summarizes the above developments concerning the impact of interactions between
entrepreneurs, business angels and venture capitalists on agency costs, cognitive costs and
value and, hence, on venture performance.
[table 5 here]
3. Investor type, governance and value creation in entrepreneurial ventures
The combined framework presented above has several empirical implications for the process
of entrepreneurial finance, the related arrangements in terms of governance, and their impact
on the performance of young growing ventures created by relatively inexperienced first-time
entrepreneurs. Knowledge has been shown to be a dynamic construct, and concepts of
cognitive cost and value are consequently highly time dependent. The potential of agency
problems can also be considered to be time-dependent, in as much as agency costs are
positively related to a firm’s size and complexity (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The respective
roles of BAs and VCs in venture governance and their impact on performance may thus
depend on the stages of venture growth and on the speed with which such growth is
accomplished.
At a very early stage in venture growth, the entrepreneur’s tacit knowledge is often crucial for
the firm’s further development and success. If the entrepreneur has no previous experience in
founding a venture, he may find it difficult to fully communicate his perception of strategic
opportunities to professional investors, since he does not “speak the same language” and does
not necessarily reason according to predictive logic. In fact, entrepreneurs have been found to
rely heavily on intuition and effectuation. So cognition should be considered as a highly
relevant variable in the process of raising equity finance, especially at a very early stage of
venture development. Strong differences in cognitive maps and processes between first-time
entrepreneurs and professional VCs may hence lead to high cognitive costs, offsetting the
venture’s value creation potential2. Business angels, especially when they are former
2 The cognitive costs must of course be compared to the size of funds invested. Certain early stage deals may
simply be too small for VCs compared to the absolute amount of cognitive costs (e.g. the total learning effort
that has to be undertaken to fully understand and value the venture’s strategic growth opportunities).
Consequently, beyond the availability of capital, cognition may be one possible explanation for why VCs
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entrepreneurs themselves, can be supposed to have a more intuitive and tacit understanding of
an inexperienced entrepreneur’s project and aspirations, without incurring the high costs of
extensive formal due diligence. Furthermore, when they share with the founders a similar
professional background in terms of industrial sector, technological and market knowledge,
they can appreciate the strategic potential of a young venture at a relatively low cognitive
cost. So the young growing venture may be able to attract BA funding without the (cognitive)
cost of capital offsetting the venture’s value creation potential. Informal direct interaction
between BAs and entrepreneurs as events unfold, may then allow for mentoring to take place,
where BAs can serve as a sounding board in strategy formulation and may share their own
personal experience as entrepreneurs. Learning thus potentially creates cognitive value,
increasing the chances of venture success. BAs with strong entrepreneurial experience of their
own and an effectual approach to doing business are able to contribute critical financial and
knowledge resources to young ventures at a low cognitive cost, hence proposition 1.
Proposition 1: BAs have a particularly strong impact on venture success and performance in
the early stages of venture growth.
As the growth process unfolds, the entrepreneurial firm grows larger and more complex,
leading to a heightened potential of agency costs. Professional VC firms are known to have
developed a series of governance mechanisms (formal due diligence, board participation,
incentive contracts ...) designed to keep agency costs at a low level. Beyond certain
thresholds, a more formal approach to governance and a certain degree of financial discipline
may become necessary to attract further growth capital. Furthermore, the nature of the
primary cognitive challenges may change once a fast growing venture crosses certain
organizational thresholds. Indeed, at more advanced stages of the venture process, it can be
supposed that entrepreneurs learn to better externalize their intitially tacit knowledge (maybe
with the help of BAs), which helps reduce cognitive costs in relationships with professional
investors. Whereas specific entrepreneurial capabilities, such as the discovery of strategic
opportunities, are critical at the very early stages of the venture process, certain managerial
and functional capabilities become a critical resource at the stage of expansion, sometimes
referred to as a firm’s adolescence. Empirical research has shown venture capitalists to assist
firms in their portfolio when it comes to professionalizing managerial functions. Thus, as a
venture grows more complex, agency costs are raised and coordination becomes more
difficult. Hence venture success may crucially hinge on governance mechanisms which keep a
check on agency costs while simultaneously allowing for a transfer of managerial know-how.
Proposition 2: VCs have a potentially strong impact on venture success and performance at
an advanced stage of venture growth (adolescence).
Typically, in fast growing ventures founded by first-time entrepreneurs the above arguments
lead us to expect the process of entrepreneurial finance to be sequential, the typical sequence
being (1) funding from BAs at relatively early stages of growth and (2) funding from VCs at
later stages of expansion (adolescence). In the process, cognitive governance (mentoring) and
certification by BAs can be expected to prepare the next stage of finance. Previous research
actually suggests that ventures having received previous financing from BAs have far more
chances to attract funds from VCs (Madill et al., 2005). A large proportion of VCs consider
that a previous investment by BAs enhances the credibility of a business and is an indication
typically invest larger amounts than BAs. In fact, the larger the funds invested, the lighter the relative weight of
cognitive costs can be expected to be.
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that the entrepreneurs are willing to take account of outsiders’ points of view (Harrison and
Mason, 2000). Thus VCs may interpret the involvement of BAs as the sign of a lower
potential need of monitoring and as a potential means to bridge the cognitive gap.
Proposition 3: Funding from BAs at an early stage of venture growth increases the
probability of successfully raising funds from VCs at later stages of the growth process.
In the UK, 58% of the VC fund managers and 36% of the BAs surveyed by Harrison and
Mason (2000) declare to have co-invested with the other category in at least one venture. VCs
consider the main advantage of co-investing with BAs is that they fill gaps in knowledge,
expertise and contacts (thus providing a cognitive value added), and BAs say that the main
advantage of co-investing with VCs is that VCs provide steady, systematic and formal due
diligence (i.e. providing formal monitoring). In certain cases, coinvestment by BAs and VCs
does not occur sequentially but takes place simultaneously. When should we typically expect
such simultaneous coinvestment by BAs and VCs and what is its impact on performance
(growth, value creation)? With an increasing number of different investors (BAs and VCs),
we can predict an increase in the number of potentially conflicting interests and, hence, a
higher potential level of agency costs. On the other hand, BAs alone may have limited
budgets and may be unable to provide all the funds necessary for firms with very large growth
opportunities. So VC-finance may be the more appropriate answer to help the venture grow
faster than what BAs could achieve. One may however wonder why one or several VCs do
not invest alone but alongside BAs. The cognitive approach to governance contains one
possible answer. In fact, it has been shown that VCs typically do not invest at very early
stages in the growth process but at expansion stages when firms already have some track
record. Cognitive gap is a possible cause. Consequently, simultaneous coinvestment by VCs
and BAs has advantages for very young ventures where the cognitive gap between VCs and
entrepreneurs is potentially large, but where a very fast pace of growth rapidly outgrows the
financial capacity of BAs. Coinvestment thus takes place when the increase of agency costs
induced by the growing dispersion of the ownership structure is set off by the combined effect
of a reduction of cognitive costs and the value creation potential inherent in growth
opportunities with capital needs which exceed BAs’ budget constraints. Hence, we should
expect the following.
Proposition 4: Coinvestment by BAs and VCs has a positive impact on the pace and speed of
venture growth.
Conclusion
This article is intended to contribute to a better understanding of the process of
entrepreneurial finance from a behavioral perspective. We specifically examine the cognitive
features and interaction of three key-actors in entrepreneurial finance: entrepreneurs, business
angels and venture capitalists and derive implications for performance (value creation and
growth) when a young venture raises external equity capital. Two theoretical frames – agency
theory and the cognitive approach to governance – are briefly reviewed as potential
complements in explaining the dynamics of entrepreneur-investor interaction and its impact
on venture performance and success. Combining the two theoretical frames yields a series of
propositions which lend themeselves to subsequent testing. These propositions help explain
BAs’ and VCs’ respective roles in governance and influence on performance at different
stages of venture growth. Concepts of cognitive cost and value enhance theoretical insight
into why BA and VC intervention is typically sequential. We also predict in what specific
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situations one should expect simultaneous coinvestment by BAs and VCs and how investors
can use cognitive levers to influence the speed of growth.
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Table 1 – Agency costs and cognitive costs in entrepreneur-investor relations
Agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) Cognitive costs
Monitoring aims at reducing information
asymmetry (e.g. through a well informed independent
board of directors).
Mentoring aims at the transfer of knowledge and
skills from business angels and VCs to entrepreneurs
and may provide psychologivcal support .. Mentoring
can take the form of serving as a “sounding board”,
giving strategic and financial advice, helping
entrepreneurs to acquire new managerial capabilities
... It aims at reducing knowledge asymmetry.
Bonding is the activity whereby managers convey
credible (and thus costly) signals that they will behave
in accordance with external shareholders’ interests.
Externalizing tacit knowledge (Nonaka et al., 2001)
consists of an entrepreneur’s efforts to transform his
tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge which can be
communicated to and appraised by external investors.
The costs of externalization are different from
bonding costs. The latter’s role is to convince
shareholders that the manager’s interests are aligned
with shareholder interests, whereas externalization of
a partially tacit mindset is aimed at convincing
(potential) shareholders of the intrinsic quality of
strategic projects.
Residual loss is due to the fact that information
asymmetry can never be completely eliminated and
that interest alignment is never perfect.
Cognitive heterogeneity persists because
mindsets are specific and path-dependent and, thus,
never perfectly aligned, in spite of mutual interaction.
Thus, some degree of mutual misunderstanding may
always persist.
Adaptated from Wirtz (2010)
Table 2 – Stylized characteristics of first-time entrepreneurs, business angels and venture
capitalists
Entrepreneurs Business angels Venture capitalists
Knowledge
base
technological, specific
industrial sector and
client market
technological, specific
industrial sector and
client market
financial, various
industrial sectors (to a
lesser extent)
Experience former employee,
entrepreneurial (recent)
entrepreneurial (strong) as a professional VC
sometimes with
consulting or
entrepreneurial
experience
Cognitive
process
intuititive
effectual (non predictive)
intuitive
predictive or non
predictive (depends on
BA)
quasi-rational
predictive
(consistent with a
professional investment
style)
Interests/utility self achievement
goodwill builders
remuneration
return on investment
goodwill builders
challenge, fun, getting
involved
return on investment
over a predetermined
horizon
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Table 3 – Investment processes featuring business angels and venture capitalists
Business angels Venture capitalists
Deal sourcing
• Sources
• Deal flow
Personal network
BA clubs/networks
VC referral
Small
Spontaneous deal flow
Other VC or BA referral
Personal network
Large
Deal screening
• Deal type
• Deal frequency and
diversification
Small, early stage (limited resources)
Low
Large, expansion stage
High : extensive resources plus contract
with investors (time constraint to invest,
minimal diversification)
Deal evaluation
• Due diligence
process
• Selection criteria
Informal and partial
Use intuition, own judgment, industry
knowledge
Use trustworthy referers
Entrepreneur (main criteria): fit, trust,
competence
Sector: link with experience and
knowledge
Financial : IRR, minimize risk of total
loss
Challenge/excitement/fun
Possibility to “add value” to venture
Social benefit (jobs creation…)
Venture location (close)
Formal and extensive
Use own judgment and consultants
Certification by BA or other VC
Entrepreneur: competence, experience,
completeness of TMT, similarity
Sector: part of fund objectives
Business model
Financial : maximize IRR/gain
Deal structuring Contracts enabling BA to be hands on
as events unfold
Tighter contracts on exit and gain
sharing when BA is more experienced
Tighter contracts when syndication
with VC
Pro-active deal making
Contracts enabling information,
monitoring, exit control, gain sharing
Contracts used as protection to perceived
agency problems
Post-investment “Offering help”
Close interactions with management
Brings entrepreneurial experience
Fills competence gap in TMT
Preparation and accreditation for VC
investment in later stage
Being hands on reduces negative exits
Exit timing is not a key issue
“Checking up on you”
Influence and control on management
Active in shaping strategy/business model
Brings financial experience
May initiate changes in TMT to fill gaps
Exit timing is essential (contract with
investors)
Sources: Boeker and Wiltbank (2005); Farrel (1998); Fiet (1995); Kaplan and Strömberg (2004); Kelly and Hay
(2003); Landström (1992); Mason and Harrison (2002); Van Osnabrugge (2000); Wiltbank (2005); Wright et
al. (1998).
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Table 4 – Agency risks and governance mechanisms used by venture capitalists
Agency risk Governance mechanism
Investor does not know entrepreneur
quality/ability (adverse selection problem;
increases if entrepreneur has limited experience)
Due diligence on management
Compensation dependant on performance (good
entrepreneurs will be more willing to accept)
Staged funding
Liquidation claims and anti-dilution provisions
Certification by business angel
Entrepreneur may not work hard enough to create
value in the post-investment phase
Active monitoring
Compensation dependant on performance
Staged funding
Conflict between VC and entrepreneur in the post-
investment phase
Contract giving board control to VC
Forced exit clause (because exit timing is key for
VC)
“Hold up” by entrepreneur (threatens to leave) Vesting entrepreneurs’ shares
Non compete contracts
Mainly from Kaplan and Strömberg (2004); plus Barney et al. (1994), Madill et al. (2005).
Table 5 – Relationships between entrepreneurs and investor-types and their supposed impact
on agency cost, cognitive cost and value
Entrepreneurs Business angels Venture capitalists
Agency
theory
Potential
conflict
of
interests
and
agency
costs
- Increases as the founders’ relative ownership stake
decreases (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bitler et al.,
2006)
- Increases with the number of different investors
- Depends on investors’ typical incentive and control
mecanisms (Baker and Wruck, 1989; Jensen, 1993):
BA’s monitoring relies on strong involvement ex-post
whereas VC’s monitoring is more formal and ex ante
(contracts) (Kelly and Hay, 2003; Van Osnabrugge,
2000)
Cognitive
approach to
entrepreneur-
investor
relations
Potential
cognitive
cost
Moderate (because of mutually
consistent entrepreneurial
attitude and cognition;
Murneiks et al., 2007 )
Moderate (because of BA’s
prior entrepreneurial
experience and track record)
- Potentially high at the outset (pre-money) for young and
unexperienced VC (who requires track record), may
decrease in the process of mutual interaction
- Lower for experienced VC (but still higher than for BA)
Potential
cognitive
value
Transfer of entrepreneurial
experience, filling competence
gaps in management team
Transfer of sector knowledge
by BA (Harrison and Mason,
2000)
Potential professionalization of managerial capabilities
(increases with VC experience, Gompers et al., 2006)
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